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Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason: 
A Reply to Arroyo, Cummisky, Molan, and Bird-Pollan 
Christine M. Korsgaard 
 
 
  I  want  to  begin  by  thanking  Christopher  Arroyo,  David  Cummiskey, 
Lydia  Moland,  and  Stefan  Bird-Pollan  for  their  interesting  and  provocative 
comments.  There’s more in these papers than I can possibly respond to in a 
reasonable space, so I’m just going to pick and choose. “The Origin of the Good 
and Our Animal Nature” spells out some of my current thinking on the good, so 
a summary of that paper will put me in a position to begin by addressing some 
of Arroyo’s and Cummiskey’s points.1   
  
1. “The Origin of the Good and Our Animal Nature” – a Summary   
  We use the term “good” in two contexts: as a form of evaluation, and to 
denominate the final end of life and action – the summum bonum, or, in our 
case,  the  “human  good.”  I  start  from  the  question  what  evaluative  and  final 
goodness have to do with each other. Do we use the same term because when 
we talk about “the human good” or “the good life” we are evaluating a life and 
its circumstances in general? If so, how do we go about doing that? Most things 
are evaluated with respect to their fitness to perform their function, but life and 
its circumstances do not have a function. 
                                       
1 The paper in question was one of three lectures I gave as the David Ross Boyd lectures 
at the University of Oklahoma in 2007 under the common title “Moral Animals,” and 
which form the basis of the book on which I am currently at work. Korsgaard:  Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason  
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  I contrast three theories of the final good: an objective realist theory that 
identifies the final good with participation in intrinsically valuable activities; a 
hedonist  theory  that  identifies  the  final  good  with  pleasure  or  agreeable 
consciousness; and Aristotle’s  account,  which identifies an  entity’s  final good 
with its well-functioning as the kind of thing that it is. The first two theories 
suggest  that  evaluative  goodness  depends  on  final  goodness;  a  thing  is  well-
functioning when its functioning contributes to its final good. Aristotle’s theory 
suggests  an  almost  opposite  relationship  between  evaluative  and  final 
goodness. It suggests that an entity is capable of a final good when it functions 
by being aware of its own evaluative goodness – that is, by being aware its own 
well-  or  ill-functioning,  or,  more  strictly,  of  states  that  signal  its  well-  or  ill-
functioning. This is because such an entity functions by developing evaluative 
attitudes – desire and aversion, pleasure and pain – towards things that affect 
its  own  functioning.  Animals  (including  human  animals)  are  entities  that 
function  by  being  aware  of  their  own  functioning.  According  to  Aristotle’s 
theory, then, it is the nature of an animal to have a final good, and final goods 
exist because there are animals. 
  Unlike some contemporary philosophers, I do not believe that this sort of 
“natural goodness,” to use Philippa Foot’s term, is inherently normative.2  But 
an account of normative goodness may be given by combining it with Kantian 
value theory.  According to Kantian value theory, things that are good for their 
own sake are not characterized by a metaphysical property of intrinsic value – 
                                       
2 Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness. Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2001. Korsgaard:  Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason  
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rather, they are valuable because someone values them for their own sake, and 
because  we  reflectively  endorse  that  value  –  that  is  to  say,  we  legislate  that 
value  in  accordance  with  the  moral  law.  In the combined theory, final goods 
exist because there are animals. Good things are good because they contribute 
to or are partly constitutive of an animal’s final good. And all of these goods are 
normative, when they are, because human beings reflectively endorse what is 
naturally  good.  This theory  explains  why  value  exists and what has  it, while 
avoiding  the  metaphysical  appeal  to  intrinsic  values.  Importantly,  it  also 
preserves an intuition that realist theories make it hard to explain – namely, 
that everything that is good is good because it is good for some valuing being, or 
some  being  who  is  capable  of  evaluative  states – that  is, for  some  person or 
animal.   
 
2. The Relation Between the Natural Good and the Right: Reply to Arroyo 
  Christopher  Arroyo  wonders  whether  the  Aristotelian  aspects  of  my 
thinking might push me towards a more realist account of the good.  What he 
has in mind is not substantive realism in the form in which it was advanced by 
G.  E.  Moore,  but  the  sort  of  realism  associated  with  Aristotle’s  functional 
account of the good – the very sort of account I discuss in the paper I have just 
summarized.  He also wonders whether my endorsement of that account of the 
good  might  push  me  towards  an  acceptance  of  the  kind  of  moral  theory 
indicated by Geach in his paper on “Good and Evil,” in which the concept of a Korsgaard:  Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason  
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good  human  act  replaces  talk  of  right  and  wrong.3    Geach  says  little  in  the 
paper in question about how we are to identify good human acts, but I think we 
may take it that the moral theory he had in mind was something along the lines 
that  Philippa  Foot  has  since  developed  in  her  book  Natural  Goodness.4  
According to this theory, we can identify a good human life in the same way we 
can  identify  a  good  plant  or  animal  life,  by  consideration  of  the  way  the 
organism functions; we can then identify virtues as properties needed to lead a 
good human life; and we can then identify good actions as those associated with 
the virtues in question.    
  Let me simply say how I stand with respect to all this.  First of all, the 
notion of the good that I favor is the notion of a life that is good in the sense 
that it is good for the animal (possibly human animal) in question, not in the 
sense that it is morally good.  However, in the paper summarized above, I do 
endorse the way that Aristotle connects the idea of a life that is good in this 
sense and a morally good life, and I will come back to that connection later.  
The Aristotelian notion of a good life that I develop is, as Geach would have it, a 
descriptive  notion  of  the  good,  rooted  in  a  conception  of  the  way  the  animal 
functions.  But as I mentioned earlier, I do not believe that this notion, all by 
itself, is a normative notion. I believe that the human good, in the descriptive 
                                       
3 Peter Geach, “Good and Evil,” Analysis, Volume 17, Number 2 (1956):  pp. 33-42. 
4 Cited above. Korsgaard:  Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason  
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sense, only becomes a normative good when we confer value upon it through 
rational choice.5   
  Arroyo  wonders  what  I  mean  when  I  say  we  “confer  value”  on  things. 
Perhaps that way of describing my view was somewhat misleading, as if value 
were  some  sort  of  substance  that  our  choices  infuse  into  certain  objects.  
Another way to put the point is to say that I think valuing is prior to value.  
Valuing  is  not  a  response  to  value,  although  it  is  a  response  to  our  natural 
good; rather, there are values because there are creatures who value things.  To 
say that we confer value on things is to record that fact.  
  The reason I think that the human good becomes a normative good only 
when we confer value upon it is that I do not believe that normativity rests in a 
relation between a person and the good.  I believe that normativity rests in the 
relations between people, including the relations between a person and herself. 
There  is normativity when  we  make  laws  for  ourselves  and  each other.   The 
good  does  not  make  laws  for  people;  people  make  laws  for  people.    So  our 
natural good has no claim on us, but we have a claim on ourselves, and on 
others,  to  choose  in  accordance  with  it.    In  The  Sources  of  Normativity,  I 
                                       
5 I also believe, incidentally, that we become committed to treating the good of the other 
animals as a normative good when we make that move.  That is a conclusion I have 
argued  for  in  my  recent  work  on  the  treatment  of  non-human  animals.  See  “Fellow 
Creatures:  Kantian  Ethics  and  Our  Duties  to  Animals”  available  at 
http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/volume25/korsgaard_2005.
pdf 
and  “Interacting  with  Animals:    A  Kantian  Account,”  forthcoming  in  The  Oxford 
Handbook on Ethics and Animals, edited by Tom Beauchamp and R. G. Frey.  Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 2010. Korsgaard:  Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason  
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discussed  some  other  moral  theories  that  involve  the  idea  that  something 
naturally  good  becomes  normatively  good  when  it  is  enacted  into  law  by  a 
rational being, or alternatively, when it is approved by the “moral sense.”6  The 
theories of Pufendorf, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and in my view Kant all 
exhibit  this kind  of  conceptual  structure.   So  an  initial point  is that I reject 
Geach’s  account  because  I  don’t  think  that  the  Aristotelian  or  functional  or 
descriptive notion of the good gives us a sense of “good” that is normative all by 
itself. 
  The  idea  that  normativity  rests  in  the  relations  between  people  is  of 
course also related to the difference between judgments of right and wrong and 
judgments of good and evil of the sort Geach favors.  Assuming that Geach had 
something like Foot’s theory in mind, I would say that the idea that someone in 
acting a certain way is exhibiting a vice, or even just that it is plainly a bad sort 
of action, does not by itself capture the sense in which his action can wrong 
another person. For that we need the thought that there are normative relations 
between the two people, not just a relation between the agent and the quality of 
his life or actions.  Foot, in Natural Goodness, proposes to cover this problem by 
asserting that one of the facts about the way human beings function is this:  
“Humans establish rules of conduct and recognize rights.”7  That’s supposed to 
be a fact about the human form of life. Once it is in place that we “recognize 
rights,” she apparently thinks we have the tools we need for explaining how you 
can  wrong  someone  else.    But  this  leaves  everything  to  be  said  about  why 
                                       
6 Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
7 Foot, Natural Goodness, cited above, p. 51. Korsgaard:  Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason  
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human beings establish rules of conduct and recognize rights – and whether 
our reasons for recognizing rights are such that we must do so, or doing so is 
merely it a workable strategy for creatures of our kind.  I think that we must 
recognize rights in order to be properly related to each other, and a theory of 
the Kantian type is needed to tell us why.  That of course is just one case of a 
more general point.  I do not believe that moral content can be derived from a 
theory of the virtues, or from a bare description of the way we in fact live.  
  However, in one way what I have just said is misleading.  I do recognize a 
connection between the rightness of action and natural or functional goodness 
of  the  sort  that  Geach  and  Foot  favor.    But  in  my  view,  the  rightness  of  an 
action does not rest simply in its constitutive contribution to the goodness of 
human life, as it does in Foot’s view.  Rather, as I argue in Self-Constitution, 
action itself has a more specific function, namely the constitution of agency or 
identity  –  and  by  extension,  in  the  case  of  interaction  with  others,  the 
constitution of shared agency.8  So on my own view, an action that is right is 
right  because  it  is  good  as  an  action,  and  good  as  an  action  because  it 
successfully realizes the function of action: the constitution or unification of the 
agency and identity of the person who acts.  
  Now let me return to the connection between a good life in the sense of a 
life that is good for a creature and in the sense that the life is morally good.  I 
                                       
8 Korsgaard, Self-Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).  Since this is the 
pervasive theme of the book, it’s a little hard to identify specific locations, but see for 
instance, §1.2.1-1.2.2 (pp. 8-9) and §1.4.1-1.4.2 (pp. 18-19); §5.1 (pp. 81-4); and for 
shared action, §9.3-9.7 (pp. 184-206).  Korsgaard:  Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason  
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said before that Aristotle’s theory of the good is in the first instance a theory of 
what  sort  of  life  is  good-for  a  certain  sort  of  creature.    It  is  not,  in  the  first 
instance, a theory of the good life in the sense of a morally good life.  In “The 
Origin of the Good  and Our Animal  Nature,” however,  I  do  argue  in  favor of 
Aristotle’s view that there is a conceptual connection between a life that is good 
for a human being and a good human life in the moral sense. More specifically, 
I argue that if Aristotle is correct in thinking both that moral virtue is essential 
to human well-functioning and that the final good is to be a well-functioning 
member  of  your  kind,  then  it  will  fall  out  as  a  kind  of  necessary  truth  that 
virtue is necessary (but not sufficient) for the achievement of the human good.   
  But this is still not an endorsement of the Geach/Foot style of ethical 
theorizing.  Geach and Foot, or at least Foot, seem to think that you can simply 
read a theory of the moral virtues off of a description of the way human beings 
in fact live and function. Justice is a virtue in human beings because human 
beings  “establish  rules  of  conduct  and  recognize  rights.”    Aristotle  himself, 
however, does not proceed like this.  While Aristotle did think that virtues in the 
strict  sense  are  properties  that  enable  a  thing  to  perform  its  function  well  – 
that’s  the  definition  of  a  virtue  or  an  ἀρετή  (areté)  in  Greek  philosophy  – 
Aristotle  thought  that  some  philosophical  work  is  required  to  show  that  the 
properties that we ordinarily call “the moral virtues” are virtues in this strict 
sense.  For him, the human function is not just “living our sort of life.” It is 
living our sort of life characterized in a particular way, namely as a life governed 
by  practical  reasoning.  And  the  argument  of  the  Nicomachean  Ethics  is 
supposed  to  show  us  how  the  properties  that  we  ordinarily  call  “the  moral Korsgaard:  Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason  
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virtues” make us good at leading a life governed by practical reason – how they 
make us good at rational choice.9  That is a way of showing that they really are 
virtues,  in  the  strict  sense.  That  element  is  entirely  lacking  from  the 
Geach/Foot  strategy  for  identifying  good  and  bad  actions.    And  without  it,  I 
think their account of what counts as a good or bad action is simply assertion. 
 
3. Kantianism vs. Consequentialism: Reply to Cummiskey 
  David Cummiskey wonders why a Kantian cannot be a consequentialist.  
Geach  and  Foot’s  style  of  argument  was  originally  addressed  against 
consequentialism:  they argued that we could give no clear sense to the idea of 
a good state of affairs. This is because – although Geach and Foot do not quite 
put  it  this  way  –  a  state  of  affairs  does  not  have  a  function.    I  begin  my 
argument in “The Origin of the Good and Our Animal Nature” with a similar 
worry, namely about whether the idea of a good life makes any sense, given that 
it is not clear that life has a function.  But I do in the end come down in favor of 
the  idea  that  we  can  formulate  a  conception  of  the  good  life,  a  descriptive 
conception, and I also argued above that we confer normative value on this sort 
of life when we choose our own good.  So our lives can be good not only in the 
sense of being good for us, but also in the sense that our good is something we 
deem worthy of choice – a good life is normatively good.  Why then shouldn’t we 
try to maximize this good?  For several reasons.   
                                       
9 I defend in this conception of what is going on in the Nicomachean Ethics in a pair of 
papers in The Constitution of Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), “Aristotle’s 
Function Argument” and “Aristotle on Function and Virtue,” pp. 129-73. Korsgaard:  Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason  
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  In the first place, I don’t think the idea of maximizing the good – that is, 
of adding  goods across the  boundaries between persons, or between  persons 
and the other animals – makes any clear sense.  Since I believe that the good is 
essentially  relational,  I  believe  that  everything  that  is  good  must  be  good  in 
virtue of being good for someone – for some person or some animal.  And a mere 
aggregation  of,  say,  my  goods  with  David’s  and  Lydia’s  and  Stefan’s  and 
Christopher’s is not obviously good for anyone, because we do not constitute an 
aggregate person  for  whom this  aggregate thing  is a  good. Aggregating  goods 
across the boundaries between persons is not really an intelligible way of “doing 
the most good.” 
   Now of course it is often objected when people make arguments of this 
kind  that  we  have  some  intuitions  in  favor  of  aggregation,  and  we  need  to 
explain them. That’s a subject I’ve been thinking about lately,10 so let me now 
modify the stark claim I just made. I think that there are some cases in which 
we can perhaps make sense of the idea of “doing more good” in a way that is 
consistent  with  the  thesis  that  everything  that  is  good  must  be  good  for 
someone.  The obvious case is when we can add more goodness-for-someone 
without  subtracting  from  anyone  else’s  good.    If  I  am  choosing  between 
confering a benefit on David alone or an equivalent benefit on both David and 
Stefan,  perhaps  I  do  “more  good”  by  conferring  the  benefit  on  both  of  them.  
That is good for David and good for Stefan, and that is doing more good than 
                                       
10 I consider aggregation in the course of arguing against that feature of Peter Singer’s 
account of our  duties to animals  in  “Interacting with Animals:  A Kantian Account,” 
cited above. Korsgaard:  Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason  
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just doing good for one  of them.  And, although I admit I have  more doubts 
about this, I think we can perhaps make the same argument about the choice 
between conferring a benefit on Lydia and conferring the same sort of benefit on 
both David and Stefan, provided no one has any prior claim on the benefit.  But 
certainly no such argument can be made about taking the benefit away from 
Lydia  to  give  it  to  David  and  Stefan.    That  may  be  better  for  David  and  for 
Stefan, but  it  is worse  for  Lydia,  and that  is all  there  is to  say. There  is  no 
aggregate third entity for whom this is better.  A second way in which it might 
make sense to say we do more good is this:  again, if there is no prior claim on a 
resource,  it  might be said that we do  more good if  we  give it to the party to 
whom it does the most good.  We give the painkiller to the one who is suffering 
the most, for example.  It perhaps makes sense to say that we do more good 
that way.  But it is essential to this argument that there is no prior claim on the 
resource being distributed.  If Christopher has a claim on the painkiller and I 
take it away from him to give it to David, that is better for David but worse for 
Christopher.  Again, there is no aggregate third entity for whom this is better.11  
Roughly speaking, if everything that is good must be good for someone, we can 
add goods by giving goods to more people, but we cannot add goods by taking 
things away from some people and giving them to others, since that is worse for 
the ones from whom things are taken away.  So I believe that maximization, the 
idea of which requires balancing some people’s goods or interests against other 
                                       
11 And if there were an aggregate third entity, the fact that it would be better for this 
third  entity  would  only  come  into  conflict  with  the  fact  that  it  would  be  worse  for 
Christopher:  nothing would be settled.  See Self-Constitution, §3.3.4, pp. 56-7. Korsgaard:  Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason  
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people’s  goods  or  interests,  is  ruled  out  on  conceptual  grounds.    It  is 
inconsistent with the thesis that everything that is good is good for someone. 
  So contrary to what Cummiskey says, I don’t think that the only problem 
with utilitarianism is its acceptance of the view that action is production. I also 
think it operates with a conceptually flawed conception of the good, that makes 
the good seem addable in ways that it is not.  Nor do I think that the dispute 
between consequentialism and deontology is exactly a dispute about the nature 
of moral reasons.  I think it runs deeper than that. 
  There are many ways in which people have characterized the essential 
difference  between  consequentialist  and  “deontological”  approaches  to  ethics. 
Often these characterizations proceed from the consequentialist point of view.  
For  example,  people  sometimes  say  that  consequentialists  think  it  is  always 
right to do what maximizes the good, while Kantians and other deontologists 
think (perversely, it is implied) that sometimes we should not do that, because 
there  are  “side-constraints”  on  the  promotion  of  the  good.    Less  polemically, 
people  sometimes  say  that  deontologists  think  that  some  actions  are 
intrinsically right, apart from their consequences, and that this kind of value 
has priority over the good. But there is another way of thinking of the difference 
between these two kinds of theories that I think is deeper and goes more to the 
heart of the matter.  This way of thinking about the difference is made available 
when  we  reflect  on  the  implications  of  Kant’s  principle  that  we  should  treat 
human beings as ends in themselves. 
  I  think  that  when  we  think  about  this  formula  we  can  see  that 
consequentialists  and  Kantians  have  different  views  about  what  the  subject Korsgaard:  Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason  
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matter of ethics is.  This is related to the conception of action as production:  
consequentialists take the subject matter of ethics to be the results produced 
by our actions, and take the main questions of ethics to be things like: “What 
results should we aim to bring about?  What should we make happen? How can 
we make the world the best possible place?”  Kantians on the other hand take 
the  subject  matter  of  ethics  to  be  the  quality  of  our  relationships  and 
interactions, both with ourselves and with each other.  So Kantians take the 
main questions of ethics to be things like “how should I treat this person? What 
do I owe to him, and to myself, in this matter? How can I relate to him properly?  
What should our interactions be like?” 
  Of course I am not saying that either view ignores the other view’s main 
questions.    But  the  order  of  dependence  is  different.    It  is  a  notorious  fact, 
much discussed in the critical literature, that consequentialists try to derive the 
values that concern the quality of our relationships from considerations about 
what does the most good.  If you should be just and honest and upright in your 
dealings with others, according to the consequentialist, that is because that is 
what does the most good.  If you are allowed to be partial to your own friends 
and family, and not required always to measure their interests against the good 
of  the  whole,  that  is  because  it  turns  out,  the  consequentialist  claims,  that 
people  maximize  the  good  of  the  whole  more  efficiently  by  attending  to  the 
welfare of their own friends and family.  It is less often noticed, but just as true, 
that  in  a  Kantian  theory,  the  value  of  producing  the  good  is  derived  from 
considerations about the quality of our relationships.  The reason that pursuing 
the good of others is a duty at all in Kant’s theory is that it is a mark of respect Korsgaard:  Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason  
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for  the humanity  of  another  that you help  him  out  when he  is in  need,  and 
more generally that you help him to promote his own chosen ends when you are 
in  a  position  to  do  that.  This  is  why  it  is  a  serious  mistake  to  characterize 
Kantian  deontology  as  accepting  a  “side-constraint”  on  the  promotion  of  the 
good.  Kant does not believe there is some general duty to maximize or even 
promote  the  good  that  is  then  limited  by  certain  deontological  restrictions.  
Rather, he believes that promoting the good of another, and treating her justly 
and honestly, are two aspects of respecting her as an end in herself.   
  In  Self-Constitution,  I  argue  that  morality  must  be  grounded  in  formal 
principles  –  principles  that  prescribe  that  we  deliberate  in  certain  ways  in 
general, like the categorical imperative – rather than in substantive principles – 
that is, principles recognized as distinctively “moral” by their content.12 And I 
argue  that  the  principle  of  utility  is  a  substantive  principle.13  Cummiskey 
sometimes describes me as “rejecting substantive principles,” but that may be a 
misleading  way  to  put  it  –  my  point  is  that  substantive  principles  must  be 
derived from formal ones.  But as Cummiskey points out, that leaves it open 
whether we might derive the substantive principle of utility from the categorical 
imperative test.  He says: 
Indeed, Kant thought that our own perfection and the happiness 
of others  were just  such  ends  [that is,  morally necessary  ends], 
and so the argument thus far does not rule out, in principle, that 
                                       
12 Korsgaard, Self-Constitution.  See §3.1-3.2  (pp. 45-52) for the distinction, and §4.2 
(pp. 64-7) for the argument. 
13 Self-Constitution, §3.3 (pp. 52-58). Korsgaard:  Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason  
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there are necessary ends that we should promote as effectively as 
possible.  Of  course,  Kant  also  thought  that  these  ends  are 
captured by imperfect duties that are limited by perfect duties, but 
this is exactly what needs to be shown and not just assumed. 
I feel like saying, “So who’s just assuming it?”  The arguments here are old and 
familiar.  Utilitarianism in principle allows that the good of some, possibly even 
the lives of some, may be sacrificed for the sake of others on the grounds – the 
intelligibility  of  which  I  have  already  challenged  –  that  this  does  more  good 
overall.  Even if aggregation were intelligible, it would allow that people should 
be treated as mere means. That is contrary to perfect duty in the most general 
sense.    And  this  shows  up  in  all  kinds  of  particular  ways.    In  principle, 
consequentialism  allows  you  to  break  promises,  commit  injustices,  violate 
rights, enslave the helpless and so forth, if it does enough good.  Even if it made 
conceptual sense, we could not will the principle of utility as a universal law 
because  we  would  have  to  reject  it  in  cases  where  these  were  the  results.  
Insisting that these cases are not really likely to come up, as utilitarians are 
wont  to  do,  is  nothing  to  the  purpose.    The  universalizability  test  does  not 
require  that  the  case  that  forces  us  to  reject  the  principle’s  standing  as  a 
universal law be likely to come up.  It only requires that there be such cases. 
  Cummiskey  is  of  course  right  in  thinking  that  I  would  reject  the 
distinction between the outcomes of decision procedures, on the one hand, and 
standards of rightness, on the other, on which many defenses of utilitarianism 
ride.  I am what in Sources I called a procedural realist and what has now come 
to be called a constructivist. According to constructivism, as I understand it, a Korsgaard:  Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason  
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normative concept exists not to describe normative entities or facts, but to mark 
out the space for the solution to some human problem.  We face a problem, the 
problem of deciding what to do, and the concept of the right is the concept of 
whatever  solves  that  problem.14    The  idea  of  a  standard  of  rightness  that  is 
literally  independent  of  a  decision  procedure  seems  like  exactly  the  sort  of 
realist metaphysics about value that a Kantian should reject.   
  It is a different point that the standard that is given by the procedure is 
not always most effectively met by actually carrying out the procedure.  Often it 
is needless because we already know the answer.  Sometimes there is no time.  
I suppose these are the sorts of cases Cummiskey has in mind when he urges 
that  the  categorical  imperative  procedure  would  yield  the  conclusion  that 
agents  should  not  always  deliberate  in  accordance  with  the  categorical 
imperative  procedure.  Cummiskey  also  urges  the  case  of  a  demon  who 
threatens  to  destroy  humanity  unless  we  all  take  a  drug  that  causes  us  to 
reason  in  accordance  with  substantive  principles  that  in  fact  are  consistent 
with  the  dignity  of  humanity,  although  (I  take  it  this  is  what  he  means)  the 
principles do not explicitly refer to the dignity of humanity, and we do not think 
about what we owe to that dignity when we apply them.  Cummiskey thinks the 
question whether we should take the drug is open and interesting. I think that 
the question is pretty much equivalent to the question whether we should agree 
to  be  slaves  if  our  masters  promised  that  they  would  never  make  us  do 
anything wrong, and if the only alternative were the destruction of humanity.  
                                       
14See  my  “Realism  and  Constructivism  in  20th  Century  Moral  Philosophy”  in  The 
Constitution of Agency, cited above. Korsgaard:  Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason  
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Perhaps the good Kantian answer is that if we are faced with the destruction of 
our capacity to think for ourselves and choose in the light of our own reflection, 
then our humanity will be destroyed either way.  So we should say “no” to the 
demon  –  for  at  least  that  way  we  will  not  have  destroyed  our  humanity 
ourselves. 
 
4. Practical Identity and the Intersubjectivity of Reason:  Reply to Moland and 
Bird-Pollan 
  Lydia Moland and Stefan Bird-Pollan in various ways urge the virtues of 
Hegel against or as a supplement to my account. Moland urges that I am forced 
to accept the Kantian view that the free and identity-unencumbered self who 
chooses to endorse our practical identies is the “real” self, while the self that 
actually  has  the  practical  identities  –  the  self  that  is  bound  by  our  ordinary 
commitments – is not the real self.  Let me first clear up one matter.  Moland 
claims that Kant’s own view is that whenever we act on desires generated by 
our commitments in the external world we do not act freely.  That is not Kant’s 
view  as  I  understand  it.    Kant’s  view  is  that  we  act  freely  so  long  as  we 
determine that a maxim of acting on the commitment in question could serve as 
a universal law.  Permissible action undertaken as such, in other words, is not 
unfree on Kant’s view. But Kant’s view as it stands makes it hard to understand 
why we would act on our desires, even when it is permissible, because it makes 
it hard to understand why we identify with them at all.  They seem just to be 
phenomena caused in us by the external forces of nature.  The idea of practical Korsgaard:  Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason  
p. 18 
 
 
 
 
identity is in part supposed to remedy this problem: we identify with our desires 
because they spring from our practical identities.  
  In  §2.4.2  of  Self-Constitution,  I  argue  that  we  do  not  have  to  choose 
between identifying with the supposedly empty “free” self and the self that is the 
subject  of  our  particular  identities  or  commitments.    Self-constitution  is  an 
ongoing process, in which what the self does is endorse and so identify with our 
specific practical identities.  Such commitment reoccurs whenever I choose to 
do what my practical identity requires, or to avoid what it forbids. If what my 
free  self  does  is  identify  with  my  specific  practical  identities,  and  I  in  turn 
identify with my free self, how am I failing to identify with my specific practical 
identities?  It endorses my practical identities, so if I identify with it, I endorse 
them too.   Once we recognize that engaging in this process of self-constitution 
is what it means to have an identity, we are not faced with a choice between 
identifying with the free self and identifying with our particular commitments.  
To put the point another way, commitment itself is an activity of the self, not a 
state  –  not  even  a  state  that  results  from  an  activity  of  the  self.    Being 
committed is like living – it is something that we do.  
  To  put  it  in  a  less  formal  way,  there  are  two  points  that  I  take  to  be 
important here.  The first is that active ongoing endorsement of my everyday 
commitments is a deeper way of identifying with them than simply taking them 
for granted or as given. Constant, active re-endorsement of your commitments 
is  not  a  way  of  distancing  yourself  from  them.  Of  course  –  and  this  is  the 
second point – I may have to set aside the claims of some particular form of 
practical identity or commitment when morality requires it.  But that does not Korsgaard:  Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason  
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show that I identify with my free self rather than with my own practical identity.  
When I  act  morally, I act  from  my identity  as  a human being, bound by the 
rules  of  our  common  humanity,  and  that  is  as  much  a  form  of  practical 
identification as any other.   
  Citing  my  view  that  we  endorse  our  contingent  practical  identities 
because we need reasons, Moland argues that “What commitments they are is 
in the end secondary so long as they provide us with reasons to act one way 
rather than another.”  She argues that we do not experience our commitments 
in this way.  I think that there is an element of contingency in our particular 
commitments,  and  that  we  can  recognize  this  without  taking  them  less 
seriously.  We are who we are, and love who we love, in large part because of 
where  we  landed,  and  we  know  that,  but  if  we  actively  endorse  our 
commitments  in  the  way  I  described  above,  that  does  not  make  them  less 
significant.  The attitude I think we should have is the one I describe at the end 
of Self-Constitution.15  Each of us is a person, but the only way to be a person is 
to be a particular person.  Our commitments are important, but they are not 
the only ones we might have had:  others are just as important.  So we should 
each of us regard our particular life as one realization of human possibility, as 
one possible realization of human value.   
  Moland  also  thinks  that  I  portray  all  commitments  “as  equal,  and 
therefore  equally  easy  to  abandon.”    I  don’t  know  what  gave  rise  to  this 
impression, but in any case that is certainly not my view.  Of course some of 
                                       
15 Self-Constitution, cited above, §10.1, pp. 207-12. Korsgaard:  Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason  
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our practical identities are more central and important than others – ordinarily, 
for instance, one’s friendships and one’s career are more central than being a 
supporter of a certain team.  And, as I certainly do make clear, I think some of 
our  practical  identities  are  re-enforced  by  our  moral  commitments,  either 
because they bring moral responsibilities in their wake – like having children, or 
accepting  a  position  –  or  because  there  is  a  moral  as  well  as  a  personal 
foundation for  them – as  in  the  case  of  gratitude towards  parents  and  other 
supportive people.   
  Moland  advocates  Hegel’s  theory  of  how  we  become  free,  which  is 
through  the  recognition  of  others.    As  she  describes  the  theory,  we  start  as 
agents who are self-determining only in the sense that we can follow our own 
desires, but we learn to evaluate our desires and sometimes curb them when 
we recognize another person’s claims to self-determination.  Here I take it that 
her argument has a common theme with that of Stefan Bird-Pollan, who argues 
we must find a way to make the step from “weak” to “strong” autonomy.  Both, 
if  I  understand  them  correctly,  think  that  what  I  call  the  publicity  or 
intersubjectivity of reason must be developed through actual interaction with 
concrete  others,  whose  claims  we  recognize.    Bird-Pollan  suggests,  although 
this  was  not in  Moland’s  account, that  this is in  part because  our  imperfect 
rationality requires, at the beginning, the reinforcement of external sanctions. 
  But  I  do  not  see  how  we  can  recognize  the  claims  of  others  unless 
reasons  are  already,  or  rather  essentially,  public  or  intersubjective.    If  I  am 
simply a being who follows my desires, the desires of others will be nothing to 
me unless I happen to desire that their desires should be satisfied.  If we were Korsgaard:  Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason  
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weakly autonomous, we could not recognize the desires of others as having a 
claim on us, because we could not recognize in others what we do not find in 
ourselves. A being that acts only on its immediate desires does not recognize 
the idea of a claim. Our ability to acknowledge the claims of others is essentially 
tied to our ability to make claims on ourselves:  there is no intelligible route 
from wantonness to autonomy through the claims of others.   
  Of course, as a matter of moral development, our interactions with others 
whom we love helps us to make a start at seeing the force of the reasons of 
others.16    We  must  learn  to  acknowledge  the  reality  of  others,  to  put  it  in 
Nagelian terms, and that is easiest  (in some ways) with the near and dear.17  
But as a matter of metaphysics, I think that our encounter with the publicity of 
reason is more intimate than that. In Chapter 9 of Self-Constitution I argue that 
reasons must be public in their normative force in order to bring unity to the 
self.  That argument is too elaborate to repeat here, but the idea is that unless I 
recognize  the  normative  force  of  the  claims  of  both  my  present  and  future 
selves, I cannot hold my own agency together over time well enough to interact 
properly with others. And the claims of my present and future self are certainly 
distinct from the desires I have now,  so that kind  of  self-unification requires 
more than  what  Bird-Pollan  calls  “weak autonomy.”   Even the  decisions  you 
                                       
16 It is also true that, developmentally, our parents and caretakers help us learn the 
kind  of  self-control  that  is  associated  with  instrumental  reasons  and  reasons  of 
prudence.  But that does not show that those reasons are constituted by our relations 
with those actual others.   
17  Thomas  Nagel,  The  Possibility  of  Altruism.    Princeton:    Princeton  University  Press, 
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make for yourself alone have to take the form of laws.  When you decide to take 
the means to an end, you are deciding to take those means even if you should 
find it difficult or painful in certain ways that might make you reluctant to take 
them.  Of course some sources of reluctance are good reasons for changing your 
mind – we do not continue to pursue an end at any cost. But if any source of 
reluctance whatever was a good reason for changing your mind, there would be 
no content to your original commitment to taking the means: you would only be 
committing  yourself  to  doing  whatever  you  felt  like  doing  anyway.18  So 
whenever we act for reasons, we make claims even on ourselves: claims whose 
normative force is public, in the sense that they reach out from one moment or 
aspect of the self to another.  That is what enables us to recognize the claims of 
others: that we see our own condition reflected in them.  
  That  actual  norms  in  their  detail  are  hammered  out  communally,  as 
Bird-Pollan urges, and that political institutions shape and limit our efforts at 
self-constitution, as Moland urges, are both points that I am happy to take on 
board, but I do not think these facts have any deep metaphysical implications 
about the foundation of morality. In my view, Hegel’s view on this matter is one 
source of the overly politicized conception of morality that has characterized the 
“continental” tradition in philosophy, which barely distinguishes moral theory 
from social thought more generally.  Of course the “analytic” tradition has its 
own  variant  of  the  over-politicized  conception  of  morality,  enshrined  in  the 
commonly stated view that morality is primarily about the “other-directed.”  In 
                                       
18 See Self-Constitution, §4.5 (pp. 76-80), for one version of this argument. Korsgaard:  Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason  
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either of its variants, I believe that an overly politicized conception of morality 
takes  us  too  far  away  from  an  insight  that  I  think  of  as  common  to  Plato, 
Aristotle, and Kant:  that our capacity for treating others rightly, and relating to 
them well in general, is in part the outward expression of an integrity that must 
be achieved inwardly by the self.  
  